Chapter 2 — From the EU agreement to Yanukovych’s fall
from Italian. Translation review is pending.
An economic decision becomes a political crisis
On 21 November 2013, Ukraine’s government suspended preparations for the Association Agreement with the European Union. Government Order 905-r is the documentary starting point. It records a decision by the executive and cannot by itself establish all the pressures behind it. That evening an appeal by journalist Mustafa Nayyem helped bring people to Independence Square in Kyiv. A single post was an identifiable trigger for people to gather within a wider movement with multiple causes. [1]
The first decisive shift came on the night of 30 November, when Berkut dispersed the protesters who remained in the square. The reasons cited by the authorities, including preparations for holiday festivities, are separate from how the intervention was carried out. Human Rights Watch documented beatings, and the European Court of Human Rights later found excessive force against a largely peaceful protest. Some people may have thrown objects. Such individual incidents did not make indiscriminate repression proportionate. [2]
Police violence broadened the protests and strengthened opposition to the government. The suspension of the EU agreement was no longer the sole focus. On 1 December, clashes and violent acts by some groups took place near the presidential administration on Bankova Street, while journalists and people uninvolved in attacks were beaten. Attacks by some participants and abuses by police both form part of the record. [2]
Frequently asked questions
What did the 21 February agreement provide for?
On 21 February, Yanukovych and opposition leaders Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko and Oleh Tyahnybok signed an agreement. It provided for a return to the 2004 constitutional framework, a unity government, early elections, and disarmament and stabilisation measures. The European witnesses included Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Radosław Sikorski and Eric Fournier. Russian representative Vladimir Lukin took part in the talks and did not sign. Those roles matter to the political meaning of the agreement. [4]
Did the 22 February vote complete an impeachment?
No. The constitutional impeachment procedure was not completed. Parliament had approved restoration of constitutional provisions on 21 February with 386 votes. The law, its entry into force and the subsequent transitional acts were separate steps. On 22 February Resolution 757-VII stated that Yanukovych had withdrawn from his duties and set the presidential election for 25 May. It passed by 328 votes. The Article 111 impeachment procedure, with its procedural requirements and qualified majority, was not completed. [5]
Did parliament ban the Russian language on 23 February?
No. On 23 February parliament also voted to repeal the 2012 language law. The acting president did not sign the measure. It did not come into force as a ban on Russian. The vote still had political consequences and fuelled fears and propaganda. [6]
Bankova Street and images without context
A single image from 1 December can serve two incompatible accounts. Heavy machinery in front of police lines and masked people involved in clashes rule out a description of the day as entirely free of violence by protesters. Footage and witness accounts also document beatings of people who were not attacking. Responsibility depends on distinguishing those confronting the police, onlookers, journalists and others in the area. [2] [16]
The identity of the entire group associated with the vehicle remains open. A covered face cannot tell a viewer whether someone was an opposition activist, a provocateur or an infiltrator. Claims of provocation need attribution. Some protesters’ violence does not establish a common plan, and documented unlawful repression does not erase their conduct. [2] [16]
The toppling of Lenin’s statue on 8 December was a symbolic act that made nationalist participation and a break with part of the Soviet legacy visible. Establishing that it happened is separate from attributing it to one group alone. Svoboda’s claim of responsibility sheds light on its participation and messaging. A flag in a photograph records presence and cannot establish the affiliation of everyone in the frame. [14]
December: diplomatic backing and economic alternatives
In December the Maidan also became a visible site of diplomatic intervention. Catherine Ashton met Ukrainian representatives. Victoria Nuland handed out food on 11 December, including to members of the security forces. John McCain and Chris Murphy met the opposition and government representatives. These episodes document political interest and public support. Establishing a U.S. command structure over the protest would require different evidence. [8]
On 17 December Moscow announced purchases of Ukrainian bonds for up to $15 billion and a reduction in the price of gas. The research distinguishes the initial $3 billion tranche from the overall programme. The financial documents leave open the question of any unannounced political conditions. International alternatives were concrete, while Ukrainian participants continued to make choices of their own. [9]
December’s choices and pressure on individuals
Western support was visible. Visits by diplomats and lawmakers showed that the movement had interlocutors abroad. McCain and Murphy also met controversial opposition figures, including Tyahnybok. That raises a question about alliances in opposition to Yanukovych. Determining who directed operations in the square requires evidence such as orders or specifically earmarked resources. A meeting documents a political relationship. [8]
The Russian offer was concrete too. The 17 December announcement included a gas price of $268.50 per thousand cubic metres and a programme of bond purchases up to $15 billion. The pledge and funds actually disbursed are distinct. Calling the offer $15 billion already delivered would overstate the payment. Establishing specific secret conditions would require other documents. [9]
Journalist and activist Tetyana Chornovol was attacked on 25 December. The evidence of the assault, including dashcam footage cited in the research, leaves separate questions about who ordered it. The attack deepened intimidation and distrust. Political plausibility alone does not establish a specific ministerial order. [15]
January: restrictions, clashes and the first deaths
On 16 January 2014 parliament adopted restrictive laws that were signed on 17 January. The show of hands and disputes over the tally are part of what happened. The opposition called them the “dictatorship laws”. A description of the measures should specify which freedoms and forms of protest were restricted. [10]
Clashes on Hrushevskoho Street from 19 January showed an escalation. Serhiy Nigoyan and Mikhail Zhyznevsky were recorded as having died of gunshot wounds on 22 January. Identifying the weapons and perpetrators is a separate inquiry. Around the same time, Yuriy Verbytsky’s abduction and death showed that violence extended beyond encounters at the barricades. The European Court of Human Rights addressed state responsibility in the abduction and ill-treatment, and the ineffective investigations. [3]
Prime Minister Mykola Azarov resigned on 28 January and the most contested laws were repealed. The compromise did not end the crisis. Political negotiations, occupations, security forces and groups that did not fully recognise the authority of the parliamentary opposition all shaped the next phase. [10]
January beyond the barricades
The way the 16 January laws were passed was central to the dispute. The show of hands was presented as sufficient, while lawmaker Volodymyr Oliynyk later questioned whether a count had occurred, according to the research. The president’s signature on 17 January made the institutional crisis inseparable from the protest. The escalation involved parliamentary acts and conduct in the streets. [10]
The Hrushevskoho clashes raised the profile of Right Sector and other organised groups. Their actions describe only part of the protest. The deaths of Nigoyan and Zhyznevsky on 22 January changed the risks protesters understood they faced, beyond detention or beatings. Identifying the weapons remains separate from establishing the deaths and their place in the sequence. [3] [16]
Verbytsky’s abduction, torture and death point to violence outside the public clashes. The research also describes men known as titushky used for attacks and intimidation. The collective name does not establish that a single centre ordered every act. Evidence of state collaboration or acquiescence is separate from identifying who ordered a specific episode. The European Court judgments carry greater weight on this issue than an isolated political remark or news summary. [3]
February: the agreement fails to stop the breakdown
Violence peaked between 18 and 20 February. Protesters and police officers died, and many people were shot along Instytutska Street on 20 February. The next chapter examines individual responsibility and separate directions of fire. The final negotiations took place after a sharp rise in the death toll. [11]
On 21 February, Yanukovych and opposition leaders Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko and Oleh Tyahnybok signed an agreement. It provided for a return to the 2004 constitutional framework, a unity government, early elections, and disarmament and stabilisation measures. The European witnesses included Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Radosław Sikorski and Eric Fournier. Russian representative Vladimir Lukin took part in the talks and did not sign. Those roles matter to the political meaning of the agreement. [4]
The protesters were divided over the agreement. That evening Volodymyr Parasiuk delivered an ultimatum demanding the president’s resignation and raising the prospect of armed action. His statement does not establish an order shared by the whole opposition or give a sole reason for Yanukovych’s departure from Kyiv. The president’s authority and parliamentary majority were already disintegrating. [12]
18–21 February: a crisis of guarantees and representation
A march to parliament and clashes nearby on 18 February opened the deadliest phase. The Party of Regions headquarters was set on fire and an employee died. The research records later charges against Chornovol. A charge brought years later is separate from a conviction. The Trade Unions Building, Maidan’s logistics centre, burned that night. The fires require separate accounts. [16]
The 19 February truce did not bring lasting calm. Weapons and armed people were already present. On the 20th, police withdrew from the square, protesters advanced or came into the open on Instytutska Street, and people were shot. Reconstructing that sequence requires times and locations. Some victims later died of their injuries, and memorial lists cover their own population, so casualty counts are not interchangeable. [11] [16]
The 21 February agreement sought a negotiated transition. It called for restoration of the 2004 constitutional framework within 48 hours, a unity government within ten days and presidential elections by December. It also covered investigations, amnesty, withdrawal from buildings and surrender of illegal weapons. Those commitments depended on the ability of the signatories to secure the conduct of actors they did not necessarily control. [4]
Parasiuk’s speech illustrates that divide. An ultimatum from the stage could exert real pressure without matching the agreement signed by three parliamentary leaders. Yanukovych’s departure from Kyiv on the night of 21–22 February was central. Attributing it solely to that speech overlooks the simultaneous collapse of political support and institutional authority. Later testimony from his security detail is a situated account of events. [5] [12]
22 February: a parliamentary vote and an incomplete impeachment process
Parliament had approved restoration of constitutional provisions on 21 February with 386 votes. The law, its entry into force and the subsequent transitional acts were separate steps. On 22 February Resolution 757-VII stated that Yanukovych had withdrawn from his duties and set the presidential election for 25 May. It passed by 328 votes. The Article 111 impeachment procedure, with its procedural requirements and qualified majority, was not completed. [5]
The vote was real, and its legal basis differed from a completed constitutional impeachment. A dispute over procedural regularity does not establish every possible meaning of the word “coup”. Conversely, the number of votes cannot supply the missing procedure. Political legitimacy and constitutional regularity remain distinct questions. [5]
On 23 February parliament also voted to repeal the 2012 language law. The acting president did not sign the measure. It did not come into force as a ban on Russian. The vote still had political consequences and fuelled fears and propaganda. [6]
Armed men occupied Crimean institutions on 27 February. On 1 March the Federation Council authorised the use of Russian forces in Ukraine. Those subsequent events do not explain every protest that had begun in November. Keeping them in chronological order avoids combining real facts into an unsupported conclusion. [13]
Parliament, the regions and the risks of hindsight
The new parliamentary majority included more than Yanukovych’s longstanding opponents. The research records votes by Party of Regions members in decisive proceedings and for Yatsenyuk’s appointment on 27 February. That shows power changing hands within institutions. Questions about specific procedures and pressure from the streets remain distinct. [5] [17]
The crowds in Kyiv provide only one view of national support. In the KIIS poll of 8–18 February, before the 20 February killings, 40.1% backed protesters, 23.3% Yanukovych and 31.9% neither side. Regional differences were pronounced. The sample predates the killings and Yanukovych’s fall and shows a country without a single view. [7]
The 23 February language vote and events in Crimea played out in that division. Separating perceptions, propaganda and laws that took effect helps explain why a measure that failed to become law still mattered politically. An unimplemented repeal and a Russian-language ban are different claims. [6] [13]
Still under verification
References on Bankova, the December visits, the January laws, the ultimatum and Crimea cover distinct episodes. Nayyem’s original post was not reopened in this review.
The cards assess specific claims against the evidence available for this article. The register lists identified references. The two checks on provenance and evidentiary support remain partial, and the chapters identify gaps.
Source register
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Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine · 905-р · 21.11.2013
- zakon.rada.gov.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
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Human Rights Watch · 03.12.2013 · ECHR · Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine
- www.hrw.org A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- hudoc.echr.coe.int A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
-
ECHR · Lutsenko and Verbytskyy v. Ukraine · Council of Europe IAP · 31.03.2015
- hudoc.echr.coe.int A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- rm.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
-
Agreement · 21.02.2014 · Ukrainska Pravda · UN Security Council S/2014/121
- www.pravda.com.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- digitallibrary.un.org A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
UN document S/2014/121 reproduces the 21 February agreement and distinguishes signatories from witnesses. It confirms what was transmitted and leaves implementation open.
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Verkhovna Rada · 742-VII · 757-VII · Constitution, art. 111
- zakon.rada.gov.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- zakon.rada.gov.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- zakon.rada.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- www.rada.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
- www.rada.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
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Ukrinform · Oleksandr Turchynov · language law
- www.ukrinform.net A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
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KIIS · National survey · 08–18.02.2014 · Attitudes toward the protests
- kiis.com.ua A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
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EU statement via OSCE · Ashton 11.12.2013 · Interfax-Ukraine · McCain/Atlantic Council · NPR
- cdn.osce.org A Original consulted · B Attributed statement
- en.interfax.com.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- www.atlanticcouncil.org A Original consulted · B Attributed statement
- www.nprillinois.org A Reporting consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- finance.yahoo.com A Copy consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
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Reuters · December 2013, via Yahoo · Law Debenture v Ukraine [2017] EWHC 655
- finance.yahoo.com A Copy consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- www.bailii.org A Copy consulted · B Relevant passage checked
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Ukraine Ministry of Finance · Prospectus · April 2016 · Recent Developments
- www.mof.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- rm.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
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OHCHR · 21.02.2020 · Maidan killings
- ukraine.ohchr.org A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
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Kyiv Post · 21.02.2014 dispatch, republished 21.02.2016 · Volodymyr Parasiuk
- www.kyivpost.com A Copy consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
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ECHR · Ukraine v. Russia (re Crimea) · Grand Chamber admissibility decision
- hudoc.echr.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
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Associated Press · 08.12.2013 · CBS News · Russian Federation submission to UN · A/68/875–S/2014/331
- www.cbsnews.com A Copy consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- digitallibrary.un.org A Original consulted · B Attributed statement
The AP report carried by CBS documents the toppling. Individual roles and exclusive attribution to any one group remain open. Russia’s submission to the UN reports a claim of responsibility by Svoboda. It documents Russia’s position and relays the claim second-hand.
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Committee to Protect Journalists · 27.12.2013 · Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group · 25.12.2013
- cpj.org A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- archive.khpg.org A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
CPJ and KHPG document the 25 December attack and report the footage. The native file and the identity of anyone who ordered the assault were not verified.
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Council of Europe IAP · 31.03.2015 · ECHR · Shmorgunov and Others v. Ukraine · OHCHR A/HRC/45/CRP.8 §78
- rm.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- hudoc.echr.coe.int A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- www.ohchr.org A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
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Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine · 27.02.2014
- www.kmu.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
