Chapter 3 — The far right and the shootings
from Italian. Translation review is pending.
Presence, influence and control
Far-right organisations took part in Maidan, and some played a particularly visible role in clashes. Their participation matters to an account of the protests. Describing the entire movement as neo-Nazi assigns one component’s identity to a varied mobilisation. The relevant questions are whom the groups represented, what they did and what decisions they could impose. [3]
Svoboda had a political history before Maidan. The party developed from the Social-National Party, was renamed in 2004 and won 37 seats in 2012. Tyahnybok’s antisemitic speech in 2004 and the European Parliament’s December 2012 resolution are relevant to that trajectory. The speech documents the leader’s words. The resolution records the Parliament’s concern and its call to avoid alliances with the party. Neither describes every protester in Kyiv in 2014. [1]
Right Sector arose during the protests as a collection of different groups. Paramilitary nationalism coexisted there with groups espousing an explicitly racial ideology. Tryzub, UNA-UNSO and Patriot of Ukraine were distinct organisations. C14 warrants separate assessment. Lumping every group that occupied a building into the neo-Nazi category erases necessary distinctions. The research, for example, treats Spilna Sprava as a militant extra-parliamentary movement without automatically grouping it with neo-Nazis.
Frequently asked questions
What do the 2014 elections show about support for the far right?
Later election results add another limit. In the May 2014 presidential election, Tyahnybok won 1.16% and Dmytro Yarosh 0.70%. In the parliamentary election Svoboda fell below the national 5% threshold. This measures electoral support at a later stage, already affected by war, and leaves the earlier role of armed groups in the streets intact. [5]
How many people were killed on 20 February according to OHCHR?
OHCHR counts 49 protesters and four police officers killed on 20 February 2014. That tally concerns a single day. The whole protest, later medical updates and the Heavenly Hundred memorial list have different scopes. The scope of each number matters when comparing them. [6]
Does the Council of Europe report identify all the shooters?
The Council of Europe’s International Advisory Panel sharply criticised the independence and effectiveness of the investigations. The report is significant for that inquiry. It does not decide the identity of each shooter. Paragraph 255 recounts information from the prosecutor about other possible firing locations, including unconfirmed information. It should be read as a record of that information, not as an independent ballistic analysis. [9]
Tracing organisations through political change
Svoboda did not first appear in November 2013. The Social-National Party changed its name and public presentation in 2004. Its origins still matter. Research examines its symbols, recruitment in the 1990s and leadership rhetoric. A rebrand does not establish a complete ideological break, and the party’s origins do not explain each later decision on their own. [1] [3]
In 2012 the European Parliament expressed concern at racist, antisemitic and xenophobic positions associated with Svoboda and urged Ukraine’s democratic forces to avoid a coalition with it. Yanukovych’s opponents nevertheless cooperated with the party. The common objective made it an acceptable partner for Ukrainian and Western interlocutors despite explicit European criticism. The cooperation does not establish a shared ideology. [1]
Right Sector poses a different question. The coalition formed during the protests and the political party established and registered in 2014 are distinct. Estimates of several hundred activists during the clashes cannot be equated with later claims of thousands of members. The explicitly racial views of Patriot of Ukraine cannot be transferred without explanation to every coalition member. [3] [12]
C14 and Spilna Sprava illustrate the limits of a single label. The research records academics’ and observers’ classifications of C14, alongside its own contested description. Spilna Sprava, led by Oleksandr Danyliuk, occupied ministries from 23 to 27 January and clashed politically with other Maidan actors. Svoboda helped force it out of the Agriculture Ministry. Groups competing over buildings and tactics did not necessarily form a single organisation. [12]
The Canadian embassy allegations and claims of foreknowledge
Protesters took refuge in the Canadian embassy on 18 February. Contemporary reports and a later reconstruction cover their stay. Taking refuge does not identify everyone as a C14 member. Even confirmed membership would not establish foreknowledge of a plan to kill. Linking presence at a location to advance knowledge would require specific communications, orders or testimony. [11]
The same distinction applies to symbols and photographs. A red-and-black flag, emblem or portrait of Bandera should be described and contextualised. The image does not measure the share of supporters in the crowd or establish a person’s operational role. A rigorous caption should explain what is visible without adding evidence the frame cannot supply.
What the numbers actually measure
A KIIS/DIF survey on 7–8 December 2013 of 1,037 people at the protest found that a very large share did not belong to a political party, organisation or movement. The 3 February survey covered 502 people in the established encampment, with a different composition from crowds at mass rallies. These findings describe participation. They are neither an ideological census nor a measure of capacity to give orders. People can hold political views without formal affiliation. [2]
Volodymyr Ishchenko examines a different subject: organised actors’ presence in reports of protest events. High visibility of Svoboda and radical groups in episodes of violence does not indicate the same share of all protesters belonged to those groups. The two types of research can describe the same movement, with many unaffiliated participants and organised minorities able to influence confrontational actions. [3]
After Yanukovych’s fall, Svoboda gained important positions, including a deputy premiership, ministries and the acting defence portfolio. A party member became prosecutor general. These were substantive positions. The presidency, premiership and most government levers remained outside the party’s control. The list of posts tells readers more than the broad label “neo-Nazi government”. [4]
Later election results add another limit. In the May 2014 presidential election, Tyahnybok won 1.16% and Dmytro Yarosh 0.70%. In the parliamentary election Svoboda fell below the national 5% threshold. This measures electoral support at a later stage, already affected by war, and leaves the earlier role of armed groups in the streets intact. [5]
The February encampment and the December crowd
The Maidan surveys are more informative when their scope is explicit. In December, the 30 November beatings were among the most common reasons given, alongside a European orientation and a desire to change life in the country. Respondents could give several reasons. The percentages are not necessarily rival camps. Stated motivations could change as the crisis developed. [2]
The 3 February sample covered the permanent camp. Men made up 88.2%, 7.7% belonged to parties and 83.5% said they came on their own initiative. These figures describe those who stayed at the camp then. They cannot reconstruct the full weekend rallies or identify who gave tactical directions. [2]
Ishchenko studies events reported in the media and organisations named in the coverage. A group with recognisable symbols and repeated involvement in clashes can be mentioned often without making up most of the participants. Its influence can still be consequential. Shares of events, people and votes have different denominators and answer different questions. [3]
From government posts to battalions: when Azov formed
Svoboda’s entry into government and the prosecutor general’s office raises questions about the relationship between protest actors and investigating bodies. A party member leading the prosecutor’s office warrants scrutiny of investigative independence. It does not establish manipulation of every decision. The same care applies to later ties between the Interior Ministry and volunteer formations. [4] [9]
Azov was formed in May 2014, after the decisive days in Kyiv. Some members and leaders came from earlier radical organisations. The later formation cannot be treated as having operated under that structure throughout Maidan. The U.S. aid controversy followed a separate timeline: a House amendment in 2015, its removal, and statutory prohibitions in 2017 and 2018. Funding bans document policy, not which transfers took place or in what amounts. [13]
20 February: locations, targets and responsibility
OHCHR counts 49 protesters and four police officers killed on 20 February 2014. That tally concerns a single day. The whole protest, later medical updates and the Heavenly Hundred memorial list have different scopes. The scope of each number matters when comparing them. [6]
At least three issues have to be kept separate. First is fire from the Conservatory towards police. The BBC’s 2015 report gathered an account from a participant identified as Serhiy, testimony from MP Andriy Shevchenko and photographs. In 2016 Ivan Bubenchyk said publicly that he had fired from the Conservatory and killed two commanders. The accounts converge on fire from Maidan positions. Attributing two specific deaths to an individual requires evidence beyond an interview. [7]
The second issue is Berkut fire along Instytutska Street. The research cites videos, prosecution material and the 18 October 2023 ruling involving five former members. Three were convicted for murders. Oleh Yanishevsky was sentenced to life, while Pavlo Abroskin and Serhiy Zinchenko received fifteen years. Another defendant was convicted of abuse of office and one was acquitted. The research records an announced appeal. These outcomes cannot be treated as a final determination of responsibility for every death. [8]
The third issue is fire from other buildings and responsibility for specific victims. A gunman seen in a building, testimony about a perceived direction of fire and a forensic match between a projectile and a weapon have different evidentiary value. Linking them requires timing, trajectories, identification of targets and comparison of material. Support for “someone fired from the Conservatory at police” cannot be transferred to “opposition leaders had protesters killed”. [7] [9]
Confessions, interviews and evidence of homicide
Bubenchyk’s statement matters because he attributes serious acts to himself. It is distinct from a tested reconstruction of the two killings he claimed. Victim identity, timing, firing position and forensic compatibility require separate corroboration. The precise floor of the Conservatory from which he said he fired remains unresolved in the material examined. This gap can be stated alongside the value of the confession. [7] [8]
Serhiy, interviewed by the BBC, describes shots at police and links them to the withdrawal. Shevchenko recalls a commander phoning about fire from the Conservatory. One describes claimed participation and the other reports a communication received. Photographs of armed men add visual context but do not link a weapon to a particular victim. The accounts converge on an episode without resolving every detail. [7]
Accounts by so-called Georgian snipers circulated in 2017 require particular care. The research records challenges over identities, documents, sums and consistency, and the prosecution’s statement that the names did not appear in entry records. Those problems weaken the specific accounts. The wider question of Georgian presence is separate. These accounts cannot be treated as a verified link in an international command chain. [14]
What a judgment can establish
The 2023 outcomes include murder convictions, acquittals and different legal classifications. Three defendants were transferred to Russia in the 2019 exchange and two returned to Kyiv in 2020, according to the research. Their later whereabouts concern enforcement and the trial context. The court’s reasoning determines how it attributed responsibility. [8]
The research compares the prosecutor’s and Katchanovski’s interpretations of passages about the Ukraina Hotel. A court can convict particular officers and record fire from other positions at the same time. What it found requires linking each claim to the full passage, the evidence discussed and the victim or event. A selected social media quotation cannot carry that analysis. [8] [9]
The IAP’s criticism of ineffective investigations makes that need more pressing. Gaps in an inquiry leave some questions open. They do not establish every alternative account. The Paet–Ashton call and Katchanovski’s interpretation should be examined on their own terms, alongside tested testimony, forensic analysis and documents about orders. [9]
Investigative gaps and the conclusions they support
The Council of Europe’s International Advisory Panel sharply criticised the independence and effectiveness of the investigations. The report is significant for that inquiry. It does not decide the identity of each shooter. Paragraph 255 recounts information from the prosecutor about other possible firing locations, including unconfirmed information. It should be read as a record of that information, not as an independent ballistic analysis. [9]
Ivan Katchanovski interprets videos, testimony and documents as pointing towards a false-flag operation. His thesis can be set out and compared with the materials. Publication in an academic journal does not establish who issued orders. Evidence suggesting multiple directions of fire does not by itself establish a single command structure, and deficient investigations do not supply missing links in that chain. [9]
The Paet–Ashton call has a similar limitation. Its authenticity establishes that the Estonian foreign minister relayed certain information. It leaves the accuracy of that information open. The subsequent disagreement expressed by the doctor to whom findings on the projectiles were attributed is essential context. [10]
The role of radical groups, fire from protester-held positions and responsibility of Berkut personnel can coexist in the same account. A claim that a single political centre organised the killings requires further evidence, particularly about who gave orders. Gaps in that evidence leave room to scrutinise specific details of the official account.
Still under verification
The judgment’s reasoning, appeal status, individual firing attributions and the text of the Globe and Mail interview remain to be checked. [8] [10]
The cards assess specific claims against the evidence available for this article. The register lists identified references. The two checks on provenance and evidentiary support remain partial, and the chapters identify gaps.
Source register
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European Parliament · TA-7-2012-0507, §8 · Oleh Tyahnybok · 2004
- www.europarl.europa.eu A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- maidan.org.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
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KIIS / Democratic Initiatives Foundation · December 2013 · February 2014
- kiis.com.ua A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- kiis.com.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
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Volodymyr Ishchenko · European Politics and Society · 2016
- doi.org A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
-
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine · 27.02.2014
- www.kmu.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
-
Central Election Commission · 2014 presidential election · OSCE/ODIHR · 2014 parliamentary election
- www.cvk.gov.ua A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- www.osce.org A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
-
OHCHR · 20.02.2020
- ukraine.un.org A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- ukraine.ohchr.org A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
-
BBC · Gabriel Gatehouse · 11.02.2015 · Bird in Flight · Ivan Bubenchyk · 19.02.2016
- www.bbc.com A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- birdinflight.com A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
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Sviatoshynskyi District Court · 759/3498/15-к · 18.10.2023 · Hromadske / Ukrainska Pravda
- hromadske.ua A Reporting consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- www.pravda.com.ua A Reporting consulted · B Dependent account
- court.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- reyestr.court.gov.ua A Access unsuccessful · B Awaiting recheck
- youcontrol.com.ua A Copy consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
Hromadske’s courtroom reporting records three murder convictions, one abuse-of-office conviction and one acquittal. Ukrainska Pravda reports that the prosecution announced an appeal and credits Hromadske and Suspilne. It is a dependent account. The operative part was consulted in a copy after the official register returned an error. Current appeal status and the full reasoning remain open.
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Council of Europe · International Advisory Panel · 31.03.2015 · Ivan Katchanovski · 2023
- rm.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- doi.org A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- rm.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
§§254–256. The prosecutor’s office told the Panel that at least three of the 49 people shot on Instytutska Street might have been shot from the Hotel Ukraina or the Conservatory. Evidence of rooftop fire striking ten people was unconfirmed. The report is not an independent ballistic analysis.
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Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 05.03.2014 · Paet–Ashton · Telegraph interview, 05.03.2014 · ITV excerpt · Paul Waldie / The Globe and Mail
- www.reuters.com A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
- vm.ee A Original consulted · B Attributed statement
- www.telegraph.co.uk A Access unsuccessful · B Awaiting recheck
- www.itv.com A Reporting consulted · B Dependent account
- www.theglobeandmail.com A Access unsuccessful · B Awaiting recheck
Estonia’s ministry confirms the call’s authenticity and date. ITV relays Bohomolets’s 5 March response to the Telegraph. The Telegraph original could not be reopened beyond its paywall. The permalink for Paul Waldie’s Globe and Mail profile was located. Bibliographic references date it to 8 March 2014. The publisher denied access. Its original text and the 10 March date cited in the research remain unverified.
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CBC · 18.02.2014 · The Canadian Press · 12.07.2015 · CBC / Global News
- www.cbc.ca A Access unsuccessful · B Awaiting recheck
- www.cbc.ca A Access unsuccessful · B Awaiting recheck
- globalnews.ca A Copy consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
The 2015 Canadian Press reconstruction was read as carried by Global News. The 18 February CBC link could not be reopened. Taking refuge does not establish C14 membership or advance knowledge of the shootings.
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Kyiv Post · 27.01.2014 · Council of Europe IAP · NPR · 07.03.2014 · Korrespondent · 29.01.2014
- www.kyivpost.com A Reporting consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- rm.coe.int A Original consulted · B Limited evidentiary support
- ua.korrespondent.net A Reporting consulted · B Attributed statement
- www.npr.org A From the research dossier · B Awaiting recheck
The IAP and Kyiv Post document the ministry occupations. The C14 reporting includes a group member’s account. Members, activists and participants in individual actions are different populations.
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Azov · Donetsk Regional State Administration · U.S. Congress · H.Amdt.492 · Pub. L. 115-31 §8131 · Pub. L. 115-141 §8129
- azov.org.ua A Original consulted · B Attributed statement
- dn.gov.ua A Original consulted · B Attributed statement
- www.congress.gov A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
- www.congress.gov A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
- www.congress.gov A Original consulted · B Relevant passage checked
The unit and regional administration date its founding to May 2014. The US records document the amendment and spending bans, leaving individual transfers unestablished.
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2017 interviews attributed to Georgian participants
Full files for the 2017 testimony were not retrieved here. The witnesses’ identities, travel and location were not independently corroborated.
