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Chapter 1 — Before Maidan: the country, its choices and the crisis

from Italian. Translation review is pending.

Independence did not erase divisions

To understand how a trade decision became a crisis of the state in 2013, start with a Ukraine that had been independent for more than twenty years and could make its own political choices. In the 1991 referendum, a majority voted for independence in every administrative unit, including Crimea and Sevastopol. That result did not make later preferences identical, but it precludes retrospectively portraying entire regions as having had no part in the decision to establish the Ukrainian state. [1]

Language, family background, region and geopolitical preference are different things. A Russian-speaking citizen might support independence, criticise Yanukovych, or favour economic ties with Moscow without wanting annexation by Russia. Two-colour maps reveal some electoral differences, but can hide those within cities, families and social groups.

The same care applies to international documents. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum contained commitments on sovereignty and security. It did not make Ukraine a NATO member or establish an automatic guarantee of military intervention equivalent to an alliance. A commitment can be important and can be breached without containing the terms later attributed to it. [2]

Frequently asked questions

Was independence supported in Crimea in 1991 too?

Yes. In the 1991 referendum, a majority voted for independence in every administrative unit, including Crimea and Sevastopol. That result did not make later preferences identical, but it precludes retrospectively portraying entire regions as having had no part in the decision to establish the Ukrainian state. [1]

Did the Budapest Memorandum guarantee automatic military intervention?

No. The 1994 Budapest Memorandum contained commitments on sovereignty and security. It did not make Ukraine a NATO member or establish an automatic guarantee of military intervention equivalent to an alliance. A commitment can be important and can be breached without containing the terms later attributed to it. [2]

Was Yanukovych elected in 2010?

In 2010 Yanukovych won an election the OSCE mission assessed as broadly meeting most democratic commitments. Saying he was never elected omits a substantial fact. The opposite argument, that his election legitimised any subsequent conduct, is also wrong. The courts, political competition and use of state resources had to be assessed as developments unfolded. [4]

Crimea, the fleet and gas before the crisis

Russia’s military presence in Crimea preceded February 2014. The 1997 Black Sea Fleet agreements governed the use of bases on territory recognised as Ukrainian. Basing rights and territorial sovereignty were separate. The stationing agreement gave Russia no right to determine Ukraine’s political orientation. [12]

In Kharkiv in 2010, Yanukovych and Dmitry Medvedev signed a twenty-five-year extension, from 2017 to 2042, tied to a gas discount. Ukraine’s president saw it as economic relief and a way to stabilise relations with Moscow. Opponents disputed the strategic cost and constitutionality. The dispute concerned a specific trade-off between energy and military bases. [12]

The 2006 and 2009 gas crises had already exposed a fragile system of prices, debts, intermediaries and transit to Europe. In January 2009, supplies destined for Ukraine and then European transit were cut in separate steps. The complete interruption began on 7 January, and transit resumed on the 20th. Ascribing a single political intention to each contract dispute would need more evidence. The political consequences of energy dependence were evident. [13]

That history explains why gas prices and external financing mattered in 2013. Costs to firms and households, foreign exchange reserves and the capacity to service debt were at stake. Kharkiv also demonstrates the strategic significance of the Russian concessions. [6] [7] [13]

Oligarchs and the presidential “Family”

Industrial groups and media owners matter because this crisis extended beyond a dispute between the president and protesters. Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash, Viktor Pinchuk and other business figures had different interests, connections and influence. Access to power did not imply uniform preferences about Europe, Russia or political succession. [14]

The “Family” was a term for the circle around Yanukovych and people linked to his son Oleksandr. The research records Serhiy Arbuzov, Oleksandr Klymenko and Eduard Stavytsky rising to key economic posts. Analyses that interpret this as state capture are distinct from a court finding on individual conduct. Membership of a network alone does not establish a crime. [14]

The oligarchs did not operate as a single command. Some had industrial interests linked to European markets. Others depended more on Russian energy and ties. Several groups could be competing with the growing presidential circle. To reconstruct their roles, identify which decisions each supported and when. [14]

Transparency International’s 2013 CPI ranked Ukraine very low. It measures perceived public-sector corruption using expert sources. It does not count established crimes or assign liability to individuals. It documents the perceived scale of the problem, while individual cases require investigation. [14]

The precedent of 2004 and the election of 2010

The Orange Revolution had already shown how elections, street protests and international competition could intersect. The dispute in 2004 concerned documented electoral irregularities and a vote that was subsequently held again, as well as geopolitical preferences. The existence of Western support for civil society is separate from proving that a foreign power invented those irregularities or directed all the protests. [3]

In 2010 Yanukovych won an election the OSCE mission assessed as broadly meeting most democratic commitments. Saying he was never elected omits a substantial fact. The opposite argument, that his election legitimised any subsequent conduct, is also wrong. The courts, political competition and use of state resources had to be assessed as developments unfolded. [4]

The case of Yulia Tymoshenko contributed to concerns about the rule of law. The European Court of Human Rights ruling cited in the research concerned her detention and the violations it found. It did not pronounce her innocent on the merits of every charge. A judgment can find fault with the authorities on one issue without settling all the others. [5]

2004: electoral fraud, protest and court intervention

The 2004 electoral sequence distinguishes events often compressed into “colour revolution”. After the first round on 31 October, the 21 November runoff was seriously contested. The OSCE documented abuse of state resources and electoral irregularities. The Supreme Court ordered a new vote, which Viktor Yushchenko won on 26 December. [3]

International assessments cannot quantify every altered vote. They distinguish the quality of the rounds and show the challenges went beyond a candidate’s propaganda. Foreign support for monitors, media and civic organisations is a separate part of the record.

The research also describes Yushchenko’s poisoning. A clinical study in The Lancet documents TCDD poisoning, which leaves the identity of perpetrators or those who ordered it open. The electoral timing and accusations cannot supply the missing evidence. Later theories about where or how it was administered remain unestablished. [15]

In 2010, after divisions in the Orange camp, Yanukovych returned to prominence through an election. The memory of fraud in 2004 could affect trust in the president in 2013. The vote of 2010 was assessed separately. Keeping the chronology straight matters to evaluating both.

Three different instruments: association, loans and conditions

On the eve of Maidan, political and trade negotiations with the EU overlapped with the need for financial support and economic ties to Russia. The Association Agreement included a deep free-trade component but did not offer immediate EU membership. Talks with the International Monetary Fund concerned separate conditions linked to economic imbalances and required policies. Conflating the two turns a set of difficult choices into an artificial referendum between prosperity without costs and sacrifice without gains. [6]

The figures also have to be placed in time. The EU’s €610 million macro-financial assistance package had a memorandum signed in Brussels in February 2013. It was not a new sum handed over at the Vilnius summit. The Russian support announced on 17 December, including bond purchases of up to $15 billion and a cut in the gas price, came after protests had started. An overall pledge and a tranche actually purchased are different amounts. [6] [7]

Ukraine’s vulnerability was real. The research describes pressure on reserves, financing needs and problems in the energy sector. Trade with Russia mattered, so checks and restrictions could impose economic costs as well as send political signals. This context helps explain the government’s stated reasons. It leaves open other motives, including personal political interests. [6]

Factors in the government’s decision

A trade agreement’s effects vary across time and economic sectors. Exporters, consumers, gas-dependent producers and a government facing debt payments have different interests. Expected benefits and immediate costs cannot be compared with one figure. [6] [8]

In 2013 Russia imposed trade restrictions and signalled possible consequences of closer ties with the EU. The research separates observed customs obstacles and delays from estimates of loss that varied by source. The highest estimate does not establish how much a measure influenced the government’s decision. [8]

The government’s account of IMF conditions also has to be checked against documents. Mykola Azarov’s account of a November 2013 letter and the material available to consult are distinct. Where the full letter is unavailable, his statements remain attributed. [6]

The same applies to Russia’s promise of unconditional support. Putin’s statement can be checked. The question of whether there were political expectations, stated or unstated, remains separate. What negotiators said documents their public position and only part of the wider talks. [7]

The decision of 21 November

The government’s order of 21 November suspended preparations for signing the EU agreement. The wording matters. The government neither signed up to another bloc nor held a referendum on Europe. It made a decision that met with growing mobilisation. [8]

The initial pro-European protest then expanded. The authorities’ response and the experience of the square changed the movement’s demands and make-up. The trade agreement alone cannot explain that shift. An explanation based solely on foreign funding overlooks the conduct of institutions and the decisions of citizens. [8]

National opinion, however, was divided. A KIIS survey in November 2013 found the proposed integration options roughly tied. The questions matter. Preferring an agreement, feeling favourably towards an organisation and saying one would support a protest measure different things. Findings from people in the square cannot be extrapolated to the entire population. [9]

NATO followed a timeline of its own

Favouring closer EU ties did not imply unanimous support for joining NATO. The 2008 Bucharest Summit had set out a future membership prospect for Ukraine and Georgia without setting an accession date. In 2013, views on the alliance still differed from views on European integration. [10]

Debate also returns to assurances in 1990 about not expanding eastward. Declassified documents record assurances given during negotiations on Germany. The resulting treaty and the political interpretation of those conversations are separate matters. The words were spoken, but treating them as a treaty that permanently banned every enlargement to every state requires steps the record does not establish. [11]

These developments explain why foreign powers attached so much importance to the crisis. Context helps explain the events. Establishing who ordered an act of violence two decades later requires specific evidence of responsibility.

Positions before 21 November

  • Yanukovych–Azarov government: It said it needed to protect economic interests and trade ties. The suspension order records its decision. Establishing all the motivations requires further evidence. [8]
  • Supporters of EU association: They saw a prospect of modernisation, rules and geopolitical orientation. Those expectations did not amount to a legal commitment to immediate accession. [8]
  • Russian Federation: It opposed a framework it considered incompatible with its regional integration project and strategic interests. Statements and trade measures should be distinguished from estimates of impact. [7] [8]
  • Non-participants and opponents: They, too, had political views. Polls show a divided society. They do not allow each view to be assigned by language or region. [9]

Still under verification

Survey findings depend on the question, sample and dates.

The cards assess specific claims against the evidence available for this article. The register lists identified references. The two checks on provenance and evidentiary support remain partial, and the chapters identify gaps.

Source register

  1. ЦДАВО · Referendum · 01.12.1991 · Ф. 1, Оп. 28, Спр. 144, Арк. 6 · Zaporizhzhia State Archive facsimile

    The state archive facsimile reproduces the 1 December results table. The rows for Crimea and Sevastopol show 54.19% and 57.07% in favour. These figures describe the referendum vote; later preferences and identities are separate.

  2. United Nations · Budapest Memorandum · A/49/765

  3. OSCE/ODIHR · Ukraine Presidential Election 2004

  4. OSCE/ODIHR · Ukraine Presidential Election 2010

  5. ECHR · Tymoshenko v. Ukraine · 49872/11

  6. IMF Country Report 14/145 · Interfax-Ukraine · 25.02.2013

  7. Reuters · 17.12.2013 · Law Debenture v Ukraine [2017] EWHC 655

  8. Ukrainska Pravda · 21.11.2013

  9. KIIS · November 2013

  10. NATO · Bucharest Summit Declaration · 2008

  11. National Security Archive · 1990 documents

  12. State Property Fund of Ukraine · 1997 Black Sea Fleet agreement, art. 6 · Kharkiv agreement and Ukrainian ratification · 2010

    The 1997 agreement governs stationing. Article 6 requires respect for sovereignty and non-interference. Ukrainian law records ratification of the Kharkiv agreement, whose text sets out the extension and discount.

  13. Simon Pirani, Jonathan Stern, Katja Yafimava · Oxford Institute for Energy Studies · NG 27 · February 2009

  14. Transparency International · Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 · OSW · The Oligarchic Democracy

    The CPI measures perceived public-sector corruption. The OSW analysis describes industrial groups and political networks. These sources do not establish individual criminal conduct.

  15. Olivier Sorg et al. · The Lancet · 2009 · DOI 10.1016/S0140-6736(09)60912-0